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 NOTE 
Arrestee Number Two, Who Are You? 
Suspicionless DNA Testing of Pre-Trial 
Arrestees and the Fourth Amendment 
Implications 
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) 
LESLEY A. HALL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 21, 2003, a man broke into the home of Vonette W., a fif-
ty-three-year-old Salisbury, Maryland, resident, and raped her at gunpoint.1  
The crime was not solved for another six years, when a DNA test revealed the 
identity of her attacker.2  That attack propelled a Fourth Amendment fight in 
the Maryland state court system over whether suspicionless DNA3 testing of 
pre-trial arrestees was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, an issue 
ultimately resolved in the Supreme Court of the United States.4 
This Note discusses the resolution of that constitutional battle, Maryland 
v. King, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that DNA testing of pre-trial 
arrestees was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a routine booking 
procedure.5  The Court also held that DNA testing’s use for arrestee identifi-
cation permitted its use as a tool to investigate suspicionless crimes.6  Part II 
analyzes the facts and holding of Maryland v. King.  Part III discusses Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, including court-established tests used to ascertain 
whether a particular search is reasonable.  Part IV examines the United States 
Supreme Court’s rationale in King, including Justice Scalia’s dissent, joined 
by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.  Lastly, Part V analyzes why 
the majority erred in determining that suspicionless DNA tests were reasona-
 
*B.S., Missouri State University, 2009; M.B.A., Missouri State University, 2011; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, 2014; Missouri Law 
Review, 2013-14.  I am grateful to Professor Frank O. Bowman III for his help and 
support. 
 1. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2013). 
 2. Id. 
 3. “DNA” means deoxyribonucleic acid.  MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-
501(g) (West 2014). 
 4. See King v. State, 42 A.3d 549 (Md. 2011), cert. granted Maryland v. King, 
133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), rev’d 133 S. Ct. 594 (2013). 
 5. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
 6. Id. 
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ble under the Fourth Amendment, how the holding further blurs Fourth 
Amendment exceptions, and how the holding diminishes the Fourth Amend-
ment’s power to protect an arrestee’s expectation of privacy.  This Note ends 
by discussing certain issues on which the Court remained silent in its opinion, 
issues that could prove dispositive in future cases. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
On September 21, 2003, a man broke into Vonette W.’s Salisbury, Mar-
yland, home.7  The man wore a scarf to conceal his identity and ordered 
Vonette W. not to look at him.8  The attacker raped Vonette W. at gunpoint 
and fled with her purse.9  An ambulance took Vonette W. to Peninsula Re-
gional Medical Center, where she underwent a forensic examination for sexu-
al assault.10  Semen was collected on a vaginal swab, the swab was subse-
quently processed, and the DNA was uploaded to the Maryland DNA data-
base.11  No matches resulted from sample comparisons in the DNA database, 
and Vonette W. was unable to positively identify her attacker.12 
On April 10, 2009, approximately six years after Vonette W.’s attack, 
Alonzo Jay King, Jr. (“King”) was arrested in Wicomico County, Maryland, 
after being accused of scaring a group of people with a shotgun.  He was 
charged with first- and second-degree assault.13  As part of their booking pro-
cedure, the Wicomico County police used a cheek swab to take a DNA sam-
ple from King, which was authorized by the Maryland DNA Collection Act 
(“Maryland Act”).14 
Prior to his April 2009 assault arrest, King was not a suspect in the 
Vonette W. rape.  However, on August 4, 2009, the Combined DNA Index 
System (“CODIS”)15 provided the Salisbury police with a “hit” on King’s 
DNA profile.16  CODIS also informed the Wicomico County, Maryland, po-
lice that a DNA sample matched their sample.17  Wicomico County police 
then identified the arrestee to whom that DNA sample belonged.18 
On October 13, 2009, Detective Barry Tucker of the Salisbury Police 
Department presented the DNA findings to a grand jury, which returned with 
 
 7. King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 553-54 (Md. 2011), cert. granted Maryland v. 
King, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), rev’d 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 554. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2013). 
 14. See id. at 1966; see also MD. CODE. ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (West 
2014). 
 15. See infra Part III.F. 
 16. King v. State, 42 A.3d at 553. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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an indictment against King for ten charges in the Vonette W. rape.19  The 
DNA hit provided Detective Tucker with probable cause for the indictment 
and with probable cause for Detective Tucker to acquire a search warrant to 
obtain another buccal swab20 from King.21  King filed a motion to suppress in 
the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, claiming that the Maryland Act that 
authorized the initial post-arrest buccal swab violated King’s Fourth Amend-
ment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.22  The Circuit Court 
denied King’s motion to suppress.23  King pled not guilty to the rape charges, 
and after a trial was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the pos-
sibility of parole for the rape.24  The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that the section of the Maryland DNA Collection Act, which allowed 
DNA collection from pre-trial arrestees, violated the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.25 
Maryland appealed, and on June 3, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari.26  In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that “DNA identification of 
arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine book-
ing procedure.”27  Specifically, the Court held that when officers made an 
arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious crime, taking and 
analyzing a buccal swab of the arrestee’s cheek was a legitimate booking 
procedure that assisted officers in identifying the arrestee.28  Justice Scalia 
wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan.29  The dissent stated that DNA testing of pre-trial arrestees did not 
identify arrestees as part of the booking procedure and instead was an uncon-
stitutional suspicionless search for criminal investigatory purposes.30 
 
 19. Id. at 554. 
 20. A buccal swab is a cotton swab or filter paper that is applied to the inside 
cheek of a suspect’s mouth.  Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965. 
 21. See King v. State, 42 A.3d at 553.  While King’s original DNA sample hit 
was inadmissible as evidence at trial, it was lawfully used as probable cause for a 
warrant to obtain a second sample.  Id. at 560 (citing MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 
2-510 (West 2012)). 
 22. Id. at 558-59. 
 23. Id. at 554-55.  After a hearing, the trial court judge issued a memorandum 
upholding the constitutionality of the Maryland DNA Collection Act’s authorization 
to collect DNA from arrestees because King’s arrest was lawful.  Id. 
 24. Id. at 555. 
 25. Id. at 555-56.  The court held that, using the totality of the circumstances 
balancing test, King’s expectation of privacy as an arrestee was greater than the 
State’s purported interest in using King’s DNA to identify him for purposes of his 
arrest on the assault charges.  Id. 
 26. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013). 
 27. Id. at 1980. 
 28. See id.  The Court also held that the swab on the arrestee’s cheek is a pain-
less and minimal intrusion.  Id. 
 29. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 30. See infra Part IV.B. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment is an essential source of individual protection 
against illegal state intrusion, especially protecting those individuals accused 
of committing criminal acts.31  The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion states as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.32 
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis has been the question of 
reasonableness.33  Whether the government is investigating a crime or per-
forming a noncriminal investigation determines what must be demonstrated 
to “search” and “seize” without violating the Fourth Amendment.34  Section 
A discusses the standard for determining whether a governmental action con-
stitutes a Fourth Amendment search.  Section B considers the standard re-
quired of law enforcement officers investigating a crime.  Section C analyzes 
the government’s burden in noncriminal administrative searches.  Section D 
examines the totality of the circumstances test that courts often use to deter-
mine Fourth Amendment reasonableness.  Section E discusses DNA testing 
of arrestees and what federal courts have held.  Finally, Section F discusses 
the Maryland DNA Act. 
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Standard 
To determine whether a search was reasonable, the initial question must 
be whether a governmental act was actually a Fourth Amendment search.  
DNA testing, according to the Court in King, was a search governed by the 
Fourth Amendment.35  In Katz v. U.S.,36 Charles Katz was convicted of 
transmitting wagering information by telephone from California to Florida 
and Massachusetts.37  The federal government recorded Katz’s telephone 
conversation while in a public telephone booth using an electronic listening 
 
 31. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 33. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment, we have often said, is reasonableness.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968-69 (2013). 
 36. 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1961) (“[T]he premise that property interests control 
the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.”). 
 37. Id. at 348.  This was a violation of federal law.  Id. 
4
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and recording device placed on the outside of the telephone booth.38  The 
Court held that the government’s eavesdropping into the public telephone 
booth violated the Fourth Amendment, explaining that the Fourth Amend-
ment “protects people – and not simply ‘areas’ – against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”39 
In Katz, Justice Harlan’s concurrence established a two-part test: first, 
that a person exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and sec-
ond, that the expectation of privacy was one that society recognized as rea-
sonable.40  Jurisprudence extending from Katz further defined the test and 
provided instructions for courts and governmental actors on whether a person 
or her actions are protected from governmental intrusion under the Fourth 
Amendment.41 
B. The Fourth Amendment Probable Cause Standard 
Fourth Amendment case law has interpreted the “reasonableness” re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment to mean that, while pursuing a criminal 
investigation, law enforcement officials must have probable cause to execute 
a warrantless arrest and search.42  In King, the Court analyzed whether the 
Fourth Amendment required probable cause of a particular crime before law 
enforcement swabbed King’s cheek.43  The Fourth Amendment speaks only 
to warrants requiring probable cause, stating that “no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”44  
The Court in Henry v. United States interpreted the Fourth Amendment to 
require that a police officer have probable cause to arrest a suspect and per-
form a search incident to that arrest.45 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 353. 
 40. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 41. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that society has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy concerning garbage left on the curb for pickup); 
see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that police use of a ther-
mal imager to look into a home was a search under the Fourth Amendment because 
the technology obtained information that could not have been obtained without a 
“physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area”); Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170 (1984) (creating the “open fields” doctrine by holding that  police entry 
and examination of open fields does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections). 
 42. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967). 
 43. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013). 
 44. U.S. CONST.  amend. IV. 
 45. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959).  In Henry, John Patrick 
Henry was convicted of unlawfully possessing cartons of stolen radios.  Id. at 98.  
Police stopped him after they watched him get into an automobile and make several 
stops in an alley, leaving their sight and returning with cartons, which he placed in a 
car and drove off.  Id. at 99-100.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the police lacked 
5
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The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to require a finding of 
probable cause to arrest a suspect and perform a search incident to that arrest 
because the Amendment’s text included a prohibition on the unreasonable 
“search and seizure” of persons.46  In Tennesee v. Garner, the Court held that 
when a police officer restrained the freedom of a person to walk away, he has 
seized that person.47 
The Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require a finding of 
probable cause to arrest a suspect.48  In Wong Sun v. United States, the Court 
held that probable cause created a reasonable person standard and that the 
police officer must have “evidence which would warrant a man of reasonable 
caution and belief that a [crime] has been committed.”49  The Court also held 
that probable cause is fact-specific and established the minimum standard 
applicable to warrantless arrests.50  The objective of the probable cause stand-
ard was to prevent unfounded arrests, or arrests on insufficient evidence of 
 
sufficient probable cause to arrest Henry because his actions did not provide police 
with reasonable grounds to believe that a particular package contained stolen radios.  
Id. at 104.  The Court stated, “And while a search without a warrant is, without limits, 
permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an 
incidental search, it must be made with probable cause.”  Id. at 102 (citing Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925)). 
 46. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); see Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (“[I]t is sufficient to note that the warrantless arrest of a person 
is a species of seizure required by the Amendment to be reasonable.”); Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89, 92 (1964). 
 47. Garner, 471 U.S. at 7 (1985).  Edward Garner ran from police and attempted 
to climb over a fence to elude police, who chased him after suspecting he had burglar-
ized a home.  Id. at 3-4.  The police shot him as he fled, killing him, and his father 
filed a lawsuit against the police, alleging that the statute that permitted police to use 
deadly force against an unarmed fleeing suspect was unconstitutional under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 4-5.  The Court reasoned that because restraining a per-
son’s freedom is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, killing a “fleeing sus-
pect” is also a seizure.  Id. at 11.  The Court held that because Garner’s son was un-
armed and running away, the officer’s act of pulling his pistol and shooting Garner’s 
son in the head was not reasonable, and thus not justified under the Fourth Amend-
ment.  Id. 
 48. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (“It is basic that an 
arrest with or without a warrant must stand upon firmer ground than mere suspi-
cion.”); see Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101-02 (1959). 
 49. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 479.  Defendants James Wah Toy and Wong Sun 
were arrested separately under suspicion of selling heroine after police chased Toy 
through his home and arrested him after an informant revealed that he had purchased 
heroine from Toy.  Id. at 472-75.  Toy claimed that Wong Sun sold heroine and police 
subsequently arrested Wong Sun at his home.  Id. at 474-75.  The Court held that 
Toy’s arrest lacked probable cause because the informant’s statements to police did 
not provide enough evidence that Toy possessed heroine.  Id. at 479. 
 50. Id. 
6
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wrongdoing.51  In lieu of taking time to obtain a warrant, a police officer may 
legally arrest an individual once the combination of facts at hand provide him 
with a reasonable belief that a felony has been committed or that a misde-
meanor has been committed in his presence.52 
C. The Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence and the Administrative 
Search 
The requirement of probable cause to “seize and search” the person is 
limited to instances where the primary objective is criminal investigation.53  
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has carved out exceptions to the probable 
cause requirement,54 including administrative searches.55  Administrative 
searches are noncriminal governmental searches that are also governed by the 
Fourth Amendment.56  The Court held in King that DNA testing of pre-trial 
arrestees constituted an administrative search because law enforcement’s 
primary goal was not criminal investigation but arrestee identification.57  In 
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, the U.S. 
Supreme Court identified a housing code inspection as an administrative 
 
 51. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (“The long-prevailing stand-
ard of probable cause protects citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with 
privacy and from unfounded charges of crime . . . .”); see also Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
 52. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 369-70 (“A warrantless arrest of an individual in a pub-
lic place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, is con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause.”); see 
also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-15 (1976). 
 53. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 535-38 (1967). 
 54. See Robert Molko, The Perils of Suspicionless DNA Extraction of Arrestees 
Under California Proposition 69: Liability of the California Prosecutor for Fourth 
Amendment Violation? The Uncertainty Continues in 2010, 37 W. ST. U. L. REV. 183, 
192 (2010) (“Over the past half century, the United States Supreme Court has carved 
out many exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s search warrant requirement; e.g., 
search incident to arrest; the automobile exception; the plain view exception; the plain 
feel exception; the airport and borders exception; the exigent circumstances excep-
tion; searches pursuant to consent; booking searches; inventory searches; pat down 
searches; protective sweeps; hot pursuit; and administrative searches.”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985) (“But this court has 
never limited the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures to 
operations conducted by the police.  Rather, the Court has long spoken of the Fourth 
Amendment’s strictures as restraints imposed upon ‘governmental action’ – that is, 
‘upon the activities of the sovereign authority.’” (quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 
U.S. 465, 475 (1921))). 
 57. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (finding that DNA testing of 
pre-trial arrestees constitutes a “routine booking procedure”). 
7
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search and held that the city’s need for the inspection outweighed a lessee’s 
privacy expectation.58 
The Court analyzed administrative searches in Colorado v. Bertine.59  
The United States Supreme Court held that a container search pursuant to a 
post-arrest inventory search was constitutional, stating that “[t]he standard of 
probable cause is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, 
noncriminal procedures . . . .  The probable cause approach is unhelpful when 
analysis centers upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking 
functions, particularly when no claim is made that the protective procedures 
are a subterfuge for criminal investigations.”60  According to the Court, in-
ventory searches provided an exception to the Fourth Amendment probable 
cause requirement because of the need to maintain an arrestee’s possessions 
for safekeeping.61 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. further discussed noncriminal administrative 
searches.  The Court held that the legality of a search of a public school stu-
dent should be determined by the reasonableness of the search, specifically 
weighing the student’s reasonable expectation of privacy against the school’s 
need for control over its students.62  T.L.O. illustrated that administrative 
searches required a standard less than probable cause.63 
 
 58. 387 U.S. at 538.  In Camara, Roland Camara, a lessee, refused to allow an 
inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of 
Public Health inside his apartment without a search warrant to conduct a “routine 
annual inspection for possible violations of the city’s Housing Code.”  Id. at 526.  
Under the applicable statute, Camara was arrested and later convicted of violating the 
San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit the warrantless inspection.  Id.  
The Court held that while these inspections were subject to Fourth Amendment con-
straints, they were reasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 538.   
Specifically, the Court balanced the city’s need for the inspections against Camara’s 
privacy invasion and determined that the inspections involved a limited invasion of 
his privacy.  Id. at 538. 
 59. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).  In Bertine, police arrested Steven Lee Bertine for driv-
ing under the influence, took him into custody, and performed an inventory search on 
his van.  Id. at 368.  In the van, police found a closed backpack with various contain-
ers housing controlled substances, including cocaine paraphernalia.  Id. 
 60. Id. at 371 (quoting S. Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)). 
 61. Id. at 372. 
 62. 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).  Here, a warrantless search of a high school stu-
dent’s purse was reasonable because the student had a lower expectation of privacy in 
the high school setting, and the need for teacher safety and control of students super-
seded what expectation of privacy the student possessed.  Id. 
 63. Id. at 342 n.8 (“We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an 
essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches . . . we have 
held that although ‘some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite 
to a constitutional search or seizure . . . the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreduci-
ble requirement of such suspicion.’  Exceptions to the requirement of individualized 
suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a 
search are minimal and where ‘other safeguards’ are available ‘to assure that the indi-
vidual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the offi-
8
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D. Fourth Amendment Totality of the Circumstances Test 
Whether a Fourth Amendment search was reasonable has often been 
measured in objective terms by examining “the totality of the circumstanc-
es.”64  In implementing this test, a court analyzes “endless variations in the 
facts and circumstances” that implicate the Fourth Amendment65 and consid-
ers “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter.”66  When a court ana-
lyzes facts surrounding a particular search, it must “assess . . . on the one 
hand, the degree to which [the search] intruded upon an individual’s privacy 
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legit-
imate government interests.”67  The King Court used the totality of the cir-
cumstances test to analyze the Maryland DNA Act.68 
Using the totality of the circumstances test, the Court first questioned 
who the person was because the degree of protection against governmental 
search is diminished depending on the person’s status in relation to the crimi-
nal justice system.69  Whether the individual has any involvement with the 
criminal justice system or is an “ordinary citizen” greatly influences his rea-
sonable expectation of privacy against government searches.70  In Samson v. 
California, the Court determined that an ordinary citizen should be afforded 
the greatest expectation of privacy,71 followed by a probationer,72 and then a 
parolee,73 who should be afforded the least expectation of privacy.74 
 
cial in the field.’” (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)). 
 64. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
 68. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013). 
 69. See, e.g., Knights, 534 U.S. at 120-22.  The Court held that a probationer had 
a lower expectation of privacy than ordinary citizens, so a search of probationer’s 
house required no more than reasonable suspicion.  Id.  The government’s need to 
ensure that the probationer does not commit any more criminal acts outweighs the 
probationer’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his home.  Id. 
 70. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006). 
 71. Id. at 849. 
 72. The Court created an assumption that probationers are more likely than ordi-
nary citizens to violate the law.  Id. at 849; see also Knights, 534 U.S. at 114-22 
(holding that reasonable suspicion was enough justification for a search of a proba-
tioner’s home because he had a diminished expectation of privacy due to his status as 
a probationer). 
 73. Parolees have an even lower expectation of privacy than probationers be-
cause they are serving the remainder of their prison sentence while among the general 
populace, making them more “akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprison-
ment.”  Samson, 547 U.S. at 850. 
 74. In Samson, a suspicionless search of a parolee was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment because, as a parolee, he served the remainder of his sentence 
9
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E. Fourth Amendment and DNA Search of Arrestees 
Prior to Maryland v. King, the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the issue 
of what expectation of privacy standard the Fourth Amendment provided pre-
trial detainees in Bell v. Wolfish.75  The Court held, inter alia, that while visu-
al cavity searches of detainees infringed upon their reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the searches were not unreasonable considering the circumstances 
because of prison officials’ need to confiscate contraband and protect them-
selves.76 
The Court also articulated a special needs test, which is considered an 
exception to Fourth Amendment reasonableness jurisprudence.  The test al-
lows searches based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.77  The Court 
defined the exception as “special needs, beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement”78 that mandated a context-specific inquiry and permitted suspi-
cionless searches when the individual’s privacy interests were minimal and 
the government’s interest in the search was great.79 
Prior to Maryland v. King, only the Third and Ninth Circuits dealt with 
constitutional challenges to suspicionless DNA testing of arrestees.  In U.S. v. 
Mitchell, Ruben Mitchell was indicted on one count of attempted possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine.80  At his arraignment, the Government 
sought a DNA sample, to which Mitchell objected, arguing that the federal 
statute81 ordering the DNA sample violated his Fourth Amendment rights.82  
The Third Circuit, applying the totality of the circumstances test, held that 
Mitchell, as a pre-trial detainee, had a diminished expectation of privacy in 
his identity that was outweighed by the government’s legitimate interest in 
collecting his DNA.83 
In United States v. Pool, Jerry Arbert Pool was charged with possessing 
and receiving child pornography in violation of federal law.84  The magistrate 
judge ordered Pool to provide a DNA sample as part of his release on bond, 
to which Pool objected, claiming a Fourth Amendment violation.85  The 
 
among the general populace and his parole was conditioned upon his willingness to 
consent to governmental searches.  Id. 
 75. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
 76. Id. at 558. 
 77. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997). 
 78. Id. at 313. 
 79. Id. at 314. 
 80. U.S. v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 389 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006). 
 82. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 389. 
 83. Id. at 415-16. 
 84. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 659 
F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 85. Id. at 1215-16. 
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Court, using the totality of the circumstances test,86 held that Pool, as a pre-
trial detainee, had a lesser expectation of privacy that was outweighed by the 
government’s interest in his DNA.87 
Finally, in Haskell v. Harris, the Ninth Circuit once again examined 
suspicionless DNA testing from pre-trial detainees.88  The California legisla-
ture had enacted the DNA Act, which required DNA testing of individuals 
convicted of certain offenses.89  A 2004 amendment provided law enforce-
ment officials with authority to obtain DNA from arrestees, which was loaded 
into a databank.90  The plaintiffs were arrestees who provided DNA samples 
but were never convicted of the felonies with which they were charged.91  
The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the 2004 amendment violated their 
Fourth Amendment rights.92  Applying the totality of the circumstances bal-
ancing test, the court held that the government’s key interests93 outweighed 
the plaintiffs’ expectation of privacy, which was diminished due to their felo-
ny arrest.94 
F.  The Maryland Act 
The Maryland Act authorizes law enforcement to collect DNA samples 
from people who were arrested and charged95 with a crime of violence,96 a 
 
 86. Pool, 621 F.3d at 1218 (“The use of the special needs test would be problem-
atic.  The test was developed in cases outside of the law enforcement context and the 
Supreme Court has been leery of applying it to criminal cases.”); see Ferguson v. City 
of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001). 
 87. Pool, 621 F.3d at 1228. 
 88. 669 F.3d 1049 (9th. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th 
Cir. 2012) and on reh’g en banc, 10-15152, 2014 WL 1063399 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 
2014). 
 89. Id. at 1050. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1052. 
 92. Id. 
 93. The court listed them as follows: “identifying arrestees, solving past crimes, 
preventing future crimes, and exonerating the innocent.”  Id. at 1062. 
 94. Id. at 1065.  The court emphasized that its reasoning was based on DNA 
extraction, processing, and analysis as it existed at the time, and acknowledged that 
future developments in the DNA technology could alter the constitutionality of Cali-
fornia’s DNA Act.  Id. at 1065. 
 95. “[E]ach DNA sample required to be collected under this section shall be 
collected: (1) at the time the individual is charged, at a facility specified by the Secre-
tary . . . .”  MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(b) (West 2014).  The DNA sample, 
which may be collected, cannot be tested or placed in a DNA database until after the 
first scheduled arraignment date unless the suspect consents or requests an earlier 
time.  § 2-504(d). 
 96. Crimes of violence include abduction, first-degree arson, kidnapping, man-
slaughter (except involuntary), maiming, murder, rape, robbery, carjacking, armed 
carjacking, first-degree sexual offenses, second-degree sexual offenses, use of a 
11
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burglary, or an attempted crime of violence or burglary.97  Under the Act, law 
enforcement may use a buccal swab to gently swab the inside cheek of the 
suspect’s mouth.98  If an arrestee is not convicted of the charges for which he 
was arrested, the DNA samples and records are required to be destroyed or 
expunged by authorities.99  According to Maryland, taking an arrestee’s DNA 
and submitting it to an online filing system helps law enforcement accurately 
identify arrestees and helps law enforcement to be confident in the arrestee’s 
identity.100 
Law enforcement submits an arrestee’s DNA to a filing system, CODIS, 
which is authorized by Congress and monitored by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) to collect and maintain DNA profiles submitted by law 
enforcement across the United States.101  CODIS connects DNA laboratories 
at the local, state, and national level and includes all fifty states and numerous 
federal agencies.102  CODIS collects DNA profiles provided by local labora-
tories103 from arrestees, convicted offenders, and forensic evidence found at 
crime scenes and lumps them into a single database.104  CODIS standardizes 
the points of comparison in the DNA samples, which are based on thirteen 
loci at which STR alleles are noted and compared.105  Comparing these loci 
 
handgun in the commission of a felony, first-degree child abuse, sexual abuse of a 
minor, an attempt to commit any of the aforementioned crimes, continuing course of 
conduct with a child, first-degree assault, assault with intent to murder, assault with 
intent to rape, assault with intent to rob, and assault with intent to commit a first- or 
second-degree sexual offense.  MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 14-101(a)(1)-(24) (West 
2014). 
 97. § 2-504(a)(3)(i)-(iii). 
 98. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013). 
 99. MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(a)(1) (West  2014).  However, the 
DNA samples are not expunged if the charges are placed on a stet docket or the ar-
restee received probation prior to the judgment.  § 2-511(a)(2) (West 2014). 
 100. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970. 
 101. Id. at 1968. 
 102. Id. 
 103. These laboratories are required to adhere to quality standards and are audited.  
Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  “DNA profiles use short tandem repeat technology (STR), to analyze the 
presence of alleles, which are codal sequences of genetic variants responsible for 
producing particular traits and characteristics.  These STRs are found at thirteen pre-
cise regions on an individual’s DNA sample.”  Stephanie Beaugh, How the DNA Act 
Violates the Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy of Mere Arrestees and Pre-Trial 
Detainees, 59 LOY. L. REV. 157, 166-67 (2013).  DNA includes coding regions, called 
“genes,” which contain proteins, while the non-coding regions, known as intergenic 
sequences, lie between the genes.  Brief for Genetic Scientists Robert Nussbaum et al. 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 
(2013) (No. 12-207).  The markers used to create DNA profiles come from non-
coding regions.  Id.  Within the nucleus of most cells, DNA is organized into twenty-
three pairs of chromosomes, and one chromosome in each pair is inherited from the 
12
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enables CODIS to match individual samples with extreme accuracy.106  
CODIS sets the uniform national standards by which DNA is matched and 
facilitates connections between local law enforcement agencies who can then 
share more specific information about the profiles.107  Among the profile 
information are the identities of those arrestees who have submitted the DNA 
samples, as CODIS only identifies these samples by the DNA profile itself, 
the name of the agency that submitted it, the laboratory personnel who ana-
lyzed it, and a numerical identification number for the specimen.108 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
A. The Majority Opinion 
In Maryland v. King, the U.S. Supreme Court explained DNA mechan-
ics, specifically that the portions of the DNA that law enforcement officials 
used to identify criminals were called “junk” DNA.109  Junk DNA consists of 
a “noncoding region” of DNA that identifies the owner of the DNA without 
showing more “far-reaching and complex characteristics like genetic 
traits.”110  The Court noted that the Maryland Act111 required that law en-
forcement officers swab the inside cheek of the individual’s mouth to collect 
skin cells with the intent to use this information to identify the individual.112  
This, the Court held, was a search under the Fourth Amendment.113  Howev-
 
person’s mother and the other from the person’s father.  Id.  The location of a gene or 
DNA marker on a chromosome is known as a “locus” or “loci” (plural).  Id. at 5.  
Alleles are “variants of a gene or DNA sequence that occur at the same locus.”  Id.  A 
person inherits two alleles from each locus, one from each parent.  Id.  DNA profiling 
“involves identifying the alleles found at multiple loci in an individual’s DNA.”  Id.  
CODIS relies on short tandem repeats (STRs), which are repeating sequences of a few 
base pairs of DNA.  Id.  Every person has two copies of the STR at a particular locus.  
Id.  Examining enough loci will produce a profile that is statistically likely to be 
unique to that person “given the frequency with which the relevant alleles occur at 
those loci in the population.”  Id. at 6. 
 106. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968.  The Court cites a statistic of one in one-hundred 
trillion.  Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 1967 (majority opinion). 
 110. Id.  Forensic analysis, according to the Court, “focuses on repeated DNA 
sequences scattered throughout the human genome, known as short tandem repeats.”  
Id.  “The alternative possibilities for size and frequency of these STRs at any given 
point along a given strand of DNA are known as alleles.”  Id.  “Multiple alleles are 
analyzed in order to ensure that the DNA profile matches only one person, and with 
near certainty.”  Id. 
 111. See supra Part III.F. 
 112. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967-68. 
 113. Id. at 1968-69. 
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er, the buccal swab was not considered intrusive, which the Court deemed 
was central to the search’s reasonableness.114 
The Court then determined which reasonableness test to employ.115  The 
Court considered the special needs test,116 but ultimately rejected it in favor 
of the totality of the circumstances test.117  The special needs test has histori-
cally been used to search law-abiding citizens who have a greater expectation 
of privacy than King.118  King, who was arrested, was in police custody and 
had a reduced expectation of privacy.119  Once an individual is arrested on 
probable cause for a dangerous offense, his expectation of privacy is reduced, 
and, therefore, DNA identification under these circumstances does not require 
consideration of any special needs that would justify searching an entire cate-
gory of people.120 
The Court recognized law enforcement’s need to process and identify 
pre-trial arrestees as a legitimate government interest.121  First, the Court stat-
ed that an individual’s identity is comprised of more than the arrestee’s 
name.122  A perpetrator could take deliberate steps to hide his true identity by 
changing his appearance and falsifying his driver’s license.123  Perpetrators 
could also falsify their criminal records, which requires police to obtain iden-
tification to determine an arrestee’s true criminal record.124  DNA provides 
“irrefutable identification” of the person from whom it was taken, leaving no 
doubt as to the perpetrator’s identity.125  DNA completes the arrestee’s profile 
and connects the arrestee’s prior criminal history to his name, Social Security 
number, aliases, and photograph.126 
Second, police officers must be concerned with facility safety with eve-
ry arrestee they book.127  DNA identification provides information about the 
 
 114. Id. at 1969. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See supra Part III.E. 
 117. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978.  The Court stated that, while certain searches do not 
warrant individualized suspicion, the special needs test has historically been applied 
in “programmatic” searches of otherwise law-abiding citizens who are not suspected 
of wrongdoing.  Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1970.  Because a lawful arrest by itself justified a search of the arrestee, 
the Court noted that the process of taking an arrestee into “[the police officers’] phys-
ical dominion” supplanted individual suspicion.  Id. at 1971. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. at 1971-72. 
 125. Id. at 1972. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  Courts in the past have approved visual inspections for gang tattoos to 
ensure rival gang members were not locked up together.  Id. 
14
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person whom police are detaining, including whether the arrestee has a histo-
ry of mental illness or violence.128 
Third, the government has an interest in ensuring that those who are ar-
rested are available for trials.129  The Court stated that, without DNA, an ar-
restee will be more prone to flee the instant charges out of fear that his con-
tinued contact with the criminal justice system will reveal to police his prior 
unclaimed offenses.130 
Fourth, an arrestee’s criminal history is important when determining 
whether a judge should release the arrestee on bail.131  Beyond whether or not 
a judge releases an arrestee on bail, the Court claimed that a DNA profile can 
assist the judge in determining when to allow bail, what conditions the ar-
restee must meet while out on bail, whether the court should revisit the initial 
release determination at a future date (upon receiving DNA information), and 
whether the arrestee’s conditional release should be revoked.132 
Governmental interests in station-house searches of the arrestee’s person 
and possessions are so important to the overall criminal justice system that, at 
times, they are more important than the governmental interests that supported 
a search immediately after arrest.133  Booking procedures, such as photo-
graphs and fingerprints, have long been standard police techniques that have 
assisted police in identifying criminal offenders.134  The Court determined 
that fingerprinting, which has been an acceptable booking procedure for dec-
ades, is the functional predecessor to DNA.135  DNA identification was de-
termined to vastly superior to fingerprinting; however, the Court claimed that 
DNA testing’s additional intrusion upon the arrestee’s person was insignifi-
cant because fingerprinting should not be used as the baseline.136 
King’s primary argument for differentiating DNA identification and fin-
gerprint identification was that, while fingerprint identification can provide 
near instantaneous results, DNA identification took more time.137  He claimed 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1972-73 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979)). 
 130. Id. at 1973.  The Court provided an example of a defendant arrested for bur-
glary: he will be more likely to run on the burglary charge out of fear that the DNA 
taken as a result of his conviction of the burglary charge will link him to a more seri-
ous rape charge, for which he likely left DNA evidence at the crime scene.  Id.  If 
police have his DNA profile pursuant to his post-arrest booking procedure, he will 
have to face both charges.  See id.  If not, his departure from custody could pose a 
safety risk to “society at large.”  Id. 
 131. Id.  Most judges must take into account what risk the arrestee poses to the 
community to which he is released, and DNA helps determine a complete criminal 
history and will assist the judge in making bail determinations.  Id. 
 132. Id. at 1974. 
 133. Id. (citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983)). 
 134. Id. at 1975-76. 
 135. Id. at 1976. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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that DNA identification took so long that the testing could not be used for 
identification purposes and was only used to collect evidence for use against 
the arrestee.138  The Court responded that the creation of the FBI’s Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (“IAFIS”), which synthesized 
fingerprints into a national database, did not make fingerprinting constitu-
tionally sound, just more effective.139  According to the Court, DNA identifi-
cation is undergoing rapid technological advances, and, just as fingerprinting 
was constitutional for decades prior to IAFIS, DNA identification is permis-
sible as a law enforcement tool today, despite its time delays.140 
Next, the Court analyzed an arrestee’s legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the custodial setting.141  The Court analyzed the intrusion upon an ar-
restee’s legitimate expectation of privacy from a cheek swab and found it to 
be minimal at most.142  Furthermore, the parts of the DNA used to identify 
arrestees were not susceptible to constitutional attack because the “junk 
DNA” provided no insight into an arrestee’s genetic traits and limited the 
information accessible to police.143  Finally, the Maryland Act precluded per-
sons from using the DNA collected for purposes other than identification.144 
Because DNA identification of arrestees is an integral part of the book-
ing procedure and DNA extraction via a buccal swab is minimally invasive, 
the Court determined that DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.145 
B. The Dissent 
Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices So-
tomayor, Ginsberg, and Kagan.146  According to the dissent, the heart of the 
Fourth Amendment was the proscription against suspicionless searches of a 
person when the motive was criminal investigation.147  The dissent believed 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. The Court provides a website for additional information on IAFIS: 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometics/iafis/iafis.  Id.  IAFIS was 
launched in 1999, despite the fact that collecting fingerprints had been part of stand-
ard booking procedures for decades prior to that time.  Id. 
 140. The Court provides websites for additional information about DNA techno-
logical advances that show DNA processing time has been reduced from one year in 
2008 to twenty days in 2012.  Id. at 1976-77. 
 141. Id. at 1978. 
 142. Id. at 1977-78.  According to the Court, “The fact that an intrusion is negli-
gible is of central relevance to determining reasonableness, although it is still a search 
as the law defines that term.”  Id. at 1969; see supra Part III. 
 143. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979. 
 144. Id. at 1979-80. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. 
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DNA testing of pre-trial arrestees was a suspicionless search.148  Indeed, pre-
vious decisions deeming suspicionless searches reasonable did not involve 
searches relating to criminal law enforcement.149 
Justice Scalia was unpersuaded by the majority’s primary justification 
for the DNA swab: the identification of the arrestee.150  He first attacked the 
majority’s use of the term “identification” as meaning something other than 
its common definition, suggesting the real reason to be “searching for evi-
dence that he has committed crimes unrelated to the crime of his arrest.”151 
Next, the dissent focused on timing.152  Maryland law precluded DNA 
testing or placement in a statewide database until a defendant had been ar-
raigned,153 and King was arrested on April 10, 2009.154  King’s DNA was not 
processed until after his initial appearance, which was three days after his 
arrest.155  The dissent found it doubtful that, during those three days, the 
Wicomico County police failed to identify King, ask for his name, or take his 
fingerprints.156 
The dissent next examined the pertinent dates.157  Maryland State Po-
lice’s Forensic Sciences Division received King’s DNA sample on April 23, 
 
 148. Id.  The dissent called attention to a time when the United States’ founding 
fathers declared general warrants, and their authority to grant officers the right to 
search a person who has not been accused of a crime, “grievous and oppressive.”  The 
remedy was the Fourth Amendment, specifically the Warrant Clause, which requires 
a warrant to be particular (individualized); the Court previously held that the Fourth 
Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches “imports the same requirement 
of individualized suspicion.”  Id. at 1980-81 (citing Va. Declaration of Rights §10 
(1776), in 1 B. Schwartz, Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 234, 235 (1971)). 
 149. “There is a closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspi-
cionless searches,” none of which deal with criminal law enforcement.  Id. (citing 
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313-14 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 609 
(1989)). 
 150. Id. at 1982-83. 
 151. If this were the case, then “identification is indistinguishable from the ordi-
nary law enforcement aims that have never been thought to justify a suspicionless 
search.”  Id. at 1983.  The dissent analogized the DNA testing with the police search-
ing every lawfully stopped car because something might turn up relating to some 
unsolved crime.  Id.  But no one would claim that such a search would “identify” the 
driver, nor would any court claim the search was lawful.  Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. The dissent claims that the Maryland legislature did not intend the statute to 
authorize DNA swabs of arrestees to assist in identification or else they would not 
have statutorily mandated that DNA be tested after the arrestee’s arraignment.  Id. 
(citing MD. CODE. ANN., PUB SAFETY § 2-504(d)(1) (West 2014)). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. “Does the Court really believe that Maryland does not know whom it was 
arraigning?”  Id. 
 157. Id. at 1984. 
17
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2009 – two weeks after his arrest.158  It was nearly three months before 
King’s lab tests were available, and four months before the DNA “hit” on a 
sample taken from an unrelated FBI database.159  King’s DNA sample was in 
an FBI database that is comprised of DNA samples taken from known con-
victs and arrestees.160  However, once the DNA sample was in the FBI data-
base, that database kept only the DNA profile itself, the name of the agency 
that submitted it, the laboratory person who analyzed it, and a numerical 
identification number.161  If law enforcement officers want to identify a per-
son in custody using DNA, they can compare an arrestee’s DNA sample to 
the FBI’s DNA database that keeps known convicts and arrestees’ DNA pro-
files.162 
However, this is not what law enforcement did.163  Instead of identifying 
the criminal with the DNA sample, the DNA sample was identified by the 
criminal.164  Once the DNA database that keeps known convicts and ar-
restees’ DNA profiles “hits” with the FBI’s DNA database that keeps un-
solved crime DNA, Maryland must backtrack to the officer who first submit-
ted the DNA to find out the identity of the known convict or arrestee from 
whom the sample was taken.165  The dissent noted that “identification” was 
not among the purposes of the Maryland statute.166  Maryland’s purpose in 
obtaining DNA samples from arrestees, according to the dissent, was “part of 
an official investigation into a crime.”167 
Next, the dissent stated that the majority’s claim that DNA profiles are a 
continuation of standard booking procedures, specifically photographs and 
fingerprints, was misguided.168  Photographs are different, namely because 
they are not considered searches at all for Fourth Amendment purposes.169  
 
 158. Id. 
 159. The DNA sample was mailed from there to a testing lab on June 25, 2009, 
two months after it was received and nearly three months after King’s arrest.  Id.  The 
data from the lab tests was not available until July 13, 2009, when it was entered into 
Maryland’s DNA database, together with King’s identifying information, informing 
Maryland to whom the DNA sample belonged.  Id.  On August 4, 2009 – four months 
after King’s arrest – the DNA “hit” a sample taken from an unrelated FBI database 
while in the FBI’s national database, and at this point, the FBI did not know to whom 
the DNA belonged.  Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1984-85. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 1985. 
 165. Id. at 1985-86. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1985 (citing MD. CODE. ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(a)(2) (West 
2014)). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1986 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413-14 (2013)) 
(“[W]e have never held that merely taking a person’s photograph invades any recog-
nized ‘expectation of privacy.’” (citing Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967))). 
18
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Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has never been asked to decide whether 
fingerprinting constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.170 
To make matters worse, according to the dissent, fingerprinting and 
DNA are not used for the same purposes, even in the booking process.171  An 
arrestee’s fingerprints are normally taken to identify arrestees, and only 
sometimes to solve crimes; DNA of arrestees is taken to solve crimes, and 
nothing else.172  Fingerprints are uploaded into a database in a matter of 
minutes, whereas DNA takes months to analyze.173  While IAFIS, the nation-
al database that maintains fingerprints of criminals, includes detailed infor-
mation such as mug shots, tattoos, and criminal histories, CODIS contains no 
personal identifiers.174  And while DNA is taken to check crime-scene evi-
dence against arrestees’ profiles, fingerprints recovered from crime scenes are 
not usually compared against a database of known fingerprints because that 
requires further police work.175 
According to the dissent, King’s legitimate expectation of privacy as a 
pre-trial arrestee outweighed the government’s interest in using his DNA for 
crime solving purposes.176  Under the dissent’s reasoning, DNA testing is not 
used to identify offenders and instead has the sole purpose of aiding law en-
forcement in criminal investigations.177  The dissent feared that this purported 
“identification” justification will erode the Fourth Amendment.178 
V.  COMMENT 
“No matter the degree of invasiveness, suspicionless searches are never 
allowed if their principal end is ordinary crime solving.  A search incident to 
arrest either serves other ends . . . or is not suspicionless.”179  In Maryland v. 
King, the Court blurred the lines between criminal investigatory searches that 
require probable cause and searches that achieve the same outcome but are 
considered a category of suspicionless invasions.  King’s holding eroded 
 
 170. Id. at 1988 (“This bold statement [that the taking of fingerprints was consti-
tutional for generations prior to the introduction of DNA] is bereft of citation to au-
thority because there is none for it.  The ‘great expansion in fingerprinting came be-
fore the modern era of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,’ and so we were never 
asked to decide the legitimacy of the practice.” (quoting United States v. Kincade, 
379 F.3d 813, 874 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting))). 
 171. Id. at 1987. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Justice Scalia pointed out that Maryland’s eighteen-day period from pro-
cessing to “hit” seems to be a “paragon of efficiency” in relation to most other states.  
Id. at 1988. 
 174. Id. at 1987. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1989. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 1982. 
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Fourth Amendment protections because it permitted law enforcement to 
search King for evidence of a crime for which law enforcement had no suspi-
cion, a theory that has proved to be violative of the Fourth Amendment.180  
King also left unanswered an important Fourth Amendment question: at what 
point will suspicionless DNA searches violate the Fourth Amendment?  This 
Part discusses King’s destructive impact on the Fourth Amendment and sug-
gests how the Court could have kept DNA searches in criminal investigations 
while sparing the Fourth Amendment. 
A.  A Square Peg in a Round Hole 
The Court’s holding in King permits law enforcement to perform suspi-
cionless DNA searches.181  Individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is an im-
portant component of the warrant process.182  The Supreme Court’s excep-
tions to individualized suspicion, described as a “closely guarded category of 
permissible suspicionless searches,”183 were meant to be narrow exceptions to 
the probable cause rule that permits suspicionless searches only when the 
search is intended to satisfy objectives other than criminal investigation.184  
Post-arrest booking procedures that include searches are justified to protect 
law enforcement safety and to obtain evidence relevant to the alleged 
crime.185  Searches that result in evidence relevant to the alleged crime are 
sound Fourth Amendment searches because they are based on the probable 
cause that justified the arrest.186  These administrative searches also prove 
fruitful for “ascertaining or verifying [the arrestee’s] identity.”187 
The Court’s assertion that DNA testing is an acceptable law enforce-
ment identification method is unfounded.188  Assuming arguendo that DNA 
testing arrestees is for identification purposes, it should be noted that DNA 
does not identify arrestees in every case.  Because CODIS only compares a 
known arrestee’s DNA to a database housing DNA collected from crime 
scenes, an arrestee will only be identified if his DNA was present at a prior 
crime scene.189  If the crime for which an arrestee was arrested is his first 
 
 180. See supra Part III.B. 
 181. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1981-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 182. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997). 
 183. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1981 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Chandler, 
520 U.S. 305 (1997)). 
 184. Miller, 520 U.S. at 314 (“When such ‘special needs’ – concerns other than 
crime detection – are alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts 
must undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private 
and public interests advanced by the parties.”). 
 185. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1983). 
 188. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 189. See Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207); see also Labor-
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss3/7
2014] ARRESTEE NUMBER TWO 775 
offense or an offense trailing a long line of offenses for which there was no 
DNA at the crime scenes, law enforcement will be unable to identify an ar-
restee using his DNA even if it were possible to use it as an identification 
tool.190 
Furthermore, Maryland law provides that fingerprinting – not DNA test-
ing – is law enforcement’s primary means of identifying an arrestee.191  Once 
a suspect is arrested and his fingerprints are taken, those fingerprints provide 
near instantaneous identification.192  Within minutes of providing the finger-
prints to the FBI through IAFIS, the FBI responds with the identity of the 
arrestee or a report that the person’s fingerprints are not on file with the 
IAFIS.193  These results are over 99% accurate.194  Indeed, many jurisdictions 
– including Maryland and the federal government – decline to DNA test ar-
restees whose DNA is already in the system, however, law enforcement will 
still fingerprint arrestees.195  The fingerprints are also used to “track” the 
DNA sample after submission into CODIS, enabling law enforcement to 
“verify the identity of the individual from whom the [DNA] sample is tak-
en.”196  The implication is clear: DNA testing on arrestees fails to identify 
arrestees. 
Comparing fingerprints and photographs to DNA testing fails to provide 
any legitimate justification for using DNA testing as an identification proce-
dure.  Photographs are not considered searches for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses.197  Humans expose their faces, including their identifying characteris-
tics (e.g. tattoos, birthmarks, scars, and hairstyles), to the public every time 
they interact with the world.  Photographing a face as a post-booking proce-
dure also provides near instantaneous identification of the arrestee because a 
cursory glance at a photograph can reveal a person’s identity faster than a 
DNA analysis, which requires submission into CODIS and then backtracking 
from the arrestee’s DNA that “hit” to the police station that submitted the 
 
atory Services, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQS) on the CODIS Program and the 
National DNA Index System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-
analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). 
 190. Laboratory Services, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQS) on the CODIS 
Program and the National DNA Index System, supra note 189. 
 191. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, et al., Supporting 
Respondent at 6-8, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 7. 
 195. Id. at 8 (citing MD. CODE REGS. 29.05.01.04.B(4) (2013)). 
 196. Id. at 5-6. 
 197. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1986 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Is 
not taking DNA samples the same, asks the Court, as taking a person’s photograph?  
No – because that is not a Fourth Amendment search at all.  It does not involve a 
physical intrusion onto the person.”); see also Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 
476 U.S. 227 (1986) (holding that aerial photography of chemical company’s indus-
trial complex was not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
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DNA.198  Not only must police use other identifying characteristics – like the 
fingerprint or the photograph – to identify whose DNA the “hit” sample be-
longs to, but DNA submission requires complex scientific analysis to ascer-
tain whether the DNA sample matches the DNA evidence found at a crime 
scene.199  In contrast, anyone with functioning eyes can quickly compare a 
photograph to a person. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of 
fingerprinting.200  Assuming that fingerprinting does constitute a search for 
Fourth Amendment purposes, fingerprinting reveals much less about a person 
– and is thus less intrusive – than DNA testing.201  Fingerprints are nothing 
more than raised ridges on the skin, specific to each human being but none-
theless exposed to the world.  We use our hands, and expose our fingerprints, 
every day of our lives.  Fingerprinting is an ideal identification tool because 
within seconds police know an inimitable trait about that person. 
Furthermore, fingerprinting does not require any physical intrusion.202  
Fingerprinting reveals nothing more than the contours of an arrestee’s print 
on an exposed part of his or her skin.203  A DNA sample requires intrusion 
into a person’s oral cavity and an extraction of cells from which police test 
the DNA.204  While the King majority held that King’s buccal swab testing 
was painless and lacked any surgical invasiveness, buccal swab testing is still 
intrusive.205  Exposing an arrestee’s oral cavity to a search is intrusive be-
cause it probes a “portal into the body” that society deems an intimate and 
private area.206 
DNA is also more revealing than fingerprinting.  A buccal swab pro-
vides a wealth of information about a person, from his genetic traits to the 
statistical likelihood of his contracting a particular disease to a predisposition 
 
 198. See supra Part IV.B. 
 199. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al., Supporting 
Respondent, supra note 191. 
 200. As Justice Scalia noted in the dissent, “This bold statement [from the majori-
ty, stating that fingerprinting has been constitutional for generations prior to the FBI’s 
IAFIS computer-matching system] is bereft of citation to authority because there is 
none for it . . . fingerprinting came before the modern era of Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence and so we were never asked to decide the legitimacy of it.”  King, 133 S. 
Ct 1958, 1988 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 201. Brief of Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia Amicus Curiae 
Support Respondent, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that warrantless 
search and seizure of defendant’s words spoken into a public telephone booth violated 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 206. Brief of Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, supra note 201. 
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to a sexual orientation.207  DNA can tell the police whether an arrestee’s child 
or parent was involved in a crime or it can establish paternity.208  While Mar-
yland law precludes the use of pre-trial arrestee’s DNA for these purposes, 
the DNA still remains in the database throughout the trial procedure, and if an 
arrestee is convicted, it remains in the database permanently.209  Furthermore, 
Maryland law specifically permits the DNA to be used for research purposes 
wholly unrelated to criminal investigations.210  Regardless of why a person is 
arrested, his propensity for prostate cancer and the prevalence of schizophre-
nia in his family are irrelevant for law enforcement purposes and extend be-
yond Fourth Amendment reasonableness.211 
A more persuasive argument is that fingerprinting – like photographing 
– is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.212  Fingerprinting’s utility in 
arrestee identification is instantaneous and reveals no more than what is col-
lected.213  Moreover, fingerprinting is often not used to solve crimes, leaving 
it to the police officer’s discretion whether to submit an arrestee’s fingerprint 
into IAFIS.214  While IAFIS does house a smaller index of “latent” finger-
prints,215 law enforcement agencies do not search that index after fingerprint-
ing an arrestee because that particular aspect of fingerprinting takes longer, is 
more complex, and costs more.216  Police do not submit fingerprints to this 
database because the fingerprints’ primary purpose is to identify arrestees.217 
In order to justify DNA testing for criminal investigation purposes with-
out individualized suspicion, the Court had to create a hybrid exception that 
permits an otherwise unconstitutional search to be conducted because DNA is 
too proficient at linking a known arrestee’s DNA to the DNA left at a crime 
scene.218  The Court praised DNA’s ability to match arrestees to crime scenes 
and held that DNA testing was constitutional because of rapid technological 
advances currently taking place.219  The Court also held that DNA testing was 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id.; see also Brief for Genetic Scientists Robert Nussbaum, et al., supra note 
105. 
 209. MD. CODE. ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(a)(1)-(2) (West 2014). 
 210. Brief for the Respondent, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-
207). 
 211. Brief of Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, supra note 201. 
 212. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1987-88 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 213. Id. at 1987. 
 214. Brief for Respondent, supra note 210. 
 215. “Latent fingerprints” are defined as fingerprints taken from a crime scene.  
Id. 
 216. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1987-88 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Brief for Respondent, supra note 210. 
 217. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1987. 
 218. Id. at 1985. 
 219. Id. at 1977 (majority opinion). 
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constitutional because DNA testing will someday be as fast as fingerprint 
analysis, and currently is much more accurate.220 
The King exception erodes the Fourth Amendment because it diminishes 
the importance of an independent magistrate’s finding of probable cause, 
which is an important component of Fourth Amendment constitutionality.221  
To force DNA testing into this sort of exception can be likened to forcing a 
square peg in a round hole.  DNA testing’s accuracy should not be relevant to 
the issue of constitutionality because, “[w]here….public safety is not genu-
inely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search . 
. . .”222 
B.  No End in Sight 
Maryland v. King failed to address at what point pre-arrest DNA testing 
would be violative of the Fourth Amendment.  The answer could be disposi-
tive in future Fourth Amendment cases. 
First, the Court held that suspicionless DNA testing of arrestees was 
reasonable when the arrest was supported by probable cause for a serious 
offense.223  The Court was silent as to whether the seriousness of the offense 
was dispositive for the post-arrest DNA test’s constitutionality.  If the fact 
that King was arrested for a serious crime was integral to the Court’s conclu-
sion that the DNA test was reasonable, then other states and the federal gov-
ernment could be violating the Fourth Amendment with their statutes.224  
Under federal law, law enforcement may obtain DNA from pre-trial arrestees 
who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted.225   Furthermore, various state 
laws have statutes that are more expansive than Maryland’s.  North Carolina, 
for example, requires a DNA sample to be taken from arrestees who are ac-
cused of committing a number of violent offenses.226  Included in North 
Carolina’s definition of “violent offenses” are cyberstalking and stalking.227  
In Ohio and Vermont, an arrestee must submit his DNA upon probable cause 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 210. 
 222. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997). 
 223. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980; see also supra Part III.F. 
[T]he Court concludes that DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable 
search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure.  When of-
ficers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense 
and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and 
analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and pho-
tographing, a legitimate booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980. 
 224. See infra notes 228-230 and accompanying discussion. 
 225. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2012); Beaugh, supra note 105, at 165-66 (2013). 
 226. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-266.3A(f)(10)-(11) (West 2014). 
 227. Id. 
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of any felony committed in the state on or after July 1, 2011.228  Likewise, 
Louisiana requires a DNA sample from all arrestees who are arrested for fel-
onies.229  The answer to whether it is constitutional for a DNA sample to be 
taken from a suspect who is arrested for failure to pay child support,230 for 
example, is unknown.  However, testing the DNA of a person arrested for a 
nonviolent misdemeanor or nonviolent felony should be considered unrea-
sonable. 
Second, although current technology permits law enforcement to use an 
arrestee’s “junk” DNA only for identification purposes,231 law enforcement 
can use junk DNA to perform “partial match searches.”232  The FBI currently 
uses these thirteen loci to perform partial match searches of its DNA data-
bases, which are called “familial searches.”233  These searches permit partial 
matches.  When there is a partial match, law enforcement is informed that the 
arrestee from whom the match was taken is a relative of the offender.234  At 
this point in time, the thirteen loci used in CODIS contain information on 
familial relationships and can match siblings with siblings and parents with 
children.235  Currently, California, Colorado, Nebraska, Texas, and Virginia 
all permit investigators to search for these partial matches, turning family 
members into “genetic informants” for the police against their own fami-
lies.236 
Partial familial matching creates a blurred constitutional line because it 
creates a partial DNA make-up without the probable cause required for an 
arrest.237  Partial “familial matching” may also be used to uncover familial 
ties that the donor did not want revealed.238  For example, partial familiar 
matching could uncover a child’s paternity or could reveal biological parents 
after a closed adoption.239 
 
 228. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 20, § 
1933 (West 2014). 
 229. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 609 (2014). 
 230. It is a class D felony in Missouri if the defendant fails to pay more than 
twelve monthly payments.  MO. REV. STAT. § 568.040.5 (2012). 
 231. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013). 
 232. Brief of 14 Scholars of Forensic Evidence as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, supra note 189. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. (citing Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Data-
bases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292-93 (2010)). 
 235. Brief for Genetic Scientists Robert Nussbaum et al. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondent, supra note 105. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Natalie Ram, The Mismatch Between Probable Cause and Partial Matching, 
118 YALE L.J., POCKET PART 182, 184 n.17 (2009). 
 238. Brief for Genetic Scientists Robert Nussbaum et al. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondent, supra note 105 at 20-21. 
 239. Id. 
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Third, while junk DNA currently identifies a particular human being, 
technological advances may permit more biological characteristics to be 
gleaned from the junk DNA.  Advances in biology and medicine may soon 
provide information about a person’s physical or mental traits and whether 
specific STR chains can be associated with particular traits or disorders.240  
Today, genetic disorders such as Down Syndrome are visible on these non-
coding regions.241 
While the Court in King considered how future technological advances 
in DNA testing could make DNA testing better at identifying arrestees, the 
Court did not consider what information the government may be able to ob-
tain when, in the future, advances will likely provide more personal infor-
mation with the same thirteen loci.242  The future potential of obtaining more 
information from one buccal swab should weigh more heavily against gov-
ernment interest and in favor of an arrestee’s reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.243 
The parameters of DNA testing’s constitutionality in King were estab-
lished with the understanding that junk DNA revealed nothing more than a 
profile specific to that arrestee.244  If junk DNA someday reveals more, it 
could provide the government with more evidence obtained without individu-
alized suspicion or other Fourth Amendment requirements.245  For example, 
if police knew that a man suspected of a violent crime was diabetic but knew 
nothing else about him, police could analyze DNA samples in their posses-
sion to identify suspects with genes that cause diabetes.246  While using the 
diabetes gene could “identify” the perpetrator,247 this practice circumvents the 
Fourth Amendment to search a person and seize incriminating information 
about him without individualized suspicion.248 
If, in the future, law enforcement is able to use the same buccal swab to 
see more of an arrestee’s characteristics, then the totality of the circumstances 
analysis in King may render pre-trial arrestee junk DNA testing unconstitu-
tional.  New scientific advances may mean that an arrestee’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy is outweighed by the governmental search.  While the 
 
 240. Id. at 23. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 at 1976-77. 
 243. Brief for Genetic Scientists Robert Nussbaum et al. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondent, supra note 105 at 10-11 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 34 (2001)). 
 244. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966-67. 
 245. Brief for Genetic Scientists Robert Nussbaum et al. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondent, supra note 105 at 14-15. 
 246. Id. at 33. 
 247. The diabetes gene would only identify the perpetrator if the perpetrator had 
been DNA tested before.  See supra Part V.A. 
 248. See supra Part V.A. 
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buccal swab does not change, information gleaned from the person does, 
which will have major privacy implications.249 
C.  Give Him His Day in Court 
Defendant King did not dispute the validity of suspicionless DNA test-
ing of convicts and parolees.250  A convicted felon has a lowered expectation 
of privacy because of his past crimes, and thus is subject to searches that 
would be considered unreasonable if he were not a convicted felon.251  The 
difference between an arrestee and a convicted felon is the “transformative 
change” in his expectation of privacy resulting from the trial and convic-
tion.252  An arrestee, still armed with the presumption of innocence, deserves 
an expectation of privacy higher than that reserved for convicted offenders.253  
King’s contention was not that DNA should never be used as a criminal in-
vestigation tool but that DNA should not be taken from a pre-trial arrestee.254  
In light of this, the Court should have noted the three scenarios in which a 
suspect may be at risk for having his DNA taken and should have distin-
guished them. 
The first scenario is one where the defendant is arrested and a DNA 
sample is taken to match against the crime for which he was arrested.  Under 
existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this is reasonable because indi-
vidualized suspicion for that crime exists.255  All bases are covered and the 
Fourth Amendment is satisfied.256 
The second scenario is one where a defendant is arrested and charged 
with a crime, and upon conviction, law enforcement takes a DNA sample and 
submits it to CODIS for future crimes.  This is also reasonable because a 
convicted felon has a lowered expectation of privacy, compared to an ordi-
nary citizen, and thus is subject to suspicionless searches.257  While it is true 
that convicted felons still have Fourth Amendment rights, their rights are less 
than law-abiding citizens or pre-trial arrestees.258  Even within the realm of 
 
 249. See supra Part II. 
 250. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 210, at 23 (citing Samson v. Cali-
fornia, 547 U.S. 843 (2006)). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 834 (9th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005)). 
 253. Id. at 24-25; see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 518 (1976) (“[E]very 
person is presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 254. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 210, at 21-22. 
 255. See supra Part III. 
 256. See supra Part III. 
 257. See supra Part III. 
 258. Noah Ehrenpreis, Constitutional Law – Diminished Expectations of Privacy 
and the Human Genome: Circuits Align on Mandatory DNA Profiling of Convicted 
Felons – U.S. v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007), 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 337, 341 
(2008). 
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“criminal offenders,” there are people who are afforded greater Fourth 
Amendment protections than others, depending on the crime they committed 
and the punishment imposed.259  So, while a case-by-case analysis must be 
used to determine a specific offender’s Fourth Amendment rights, many 
DNA tests on convicted felons will be reasonable due to their diminished 
status.260  The Fourth Amendment is satisfied in this situation. 
The third scenario is the scene played out before us in King, which is 
different from the prior scenarios because of the lack of either reduced expec-
tation of privacy or individualized suspicion.261  As illustrated, the Court 
could have preserved the Fourth Amendment in a more effective manner by 
separating the rhetoric from reality and proscribing DNA tests without the 
proper Fourth Amendment constraints in place.  Unfortunately, as the law 
stands, law enforcement and prosecutors are given obvious ways to skirt the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s holding in King distorts the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tions and erodes an arrestee’s rights.  While DNA testing aids in crime solv-
ing, taking DNA samples from pre-trial arrestees for suspicionless criminal 
investigatory searches violates the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against 
unreasonable searches, and King’s holding further erodes the protections of 
those who are presumed innocent.  As Justice Scalia announced in his dissent, 
while solving unsolved crimes is a noble objective, “it occupies a lower place 
in the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protection of our peo-




 259. Id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See supra Part V.B. 
 262. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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